THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION:
TIME FOR RETHINKING
BLAKE M. RHODESt

[I]t is timefor the Panel[and Congress]to reevaluate and redefine
thefuture use of section 1407.1
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (Panel) is in its
twenty-third year of existence. It was created to coordinate the
discovery, or pretrial, phase of cases involving common questions
of fact that have been filed in different federal district courts. 2 The
Panel's objective is to promote efficient and expeditious processing
of these factually related cases.3 It has affected tens of thousands
of cases in the federal judicial system 4 and, no doubt, will continue

t B.B.A 1989, Iowa State University; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of
Pennsylvania. This Comment was written for Professor A. Leo Levin's seminar,
entitled Selected Topics in Civil Procedure andJudicial Administration. I am grateful
to Professor Levin for his support. I dedicate this Comment to my wife Paige,
although I doubt she will ever read it.
'Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40
FORDHAM L. REviEw 41, 66 (1971).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1898; S. REP. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
3 See H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1899.
" See Patricia D. Howard, A Guideto MultidistrictLitigation, 124 F.R.D. 479 (1989).
Between September 1968 andJune 1988, over 10,200 actions were transferred by the
Panel. Combining these cases with the 6,500 that were already pending in the
transferee districts, nearly 17,000 cases were consolidated by the Panel during its first
20 years. See id. at 480. There is no indication that the number of transfers is
diminishing. A monumental transfer of gargantuan proportions took place this past
summer. After refusing to consolidate various asbestos litigations on five different
occasions, the Panel transferred 26,639 asbestos cases tojudge Charles R. Weiner in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI),
771 F. Supp. 415, 418 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (reasoning that "this litigation has reached a
magnitude ... that threatens the administration ofjustice and that requires a new,
streamlined approach").
In addition to the Panel's obvious impact on an action it transfers, the Panel may
affect cases in subtler ways. A litigant's viewpoint on the virtues of multidistrict
litigation may influence the choice of judicial system in which to litigate; the
availability or possibility of consolidation in federal district courts may encourage or
discourage litigants from bringing their actions in or removing their actions to federal
court. Additionally, a plaintiff who is in the federal system yet unable to participate
effectivelyin proceedings transferred to a distant forum may be encouraged to settle.
Although less likely, a defendant, too, may prefer settlement to consolidation.
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to do so. The Panel's role in multidistrict litigation, however, needs
to be enhanced.
The statute governing the Panel, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, 5 permits the
Panel to transfer cases solely for pretrial purposes-it is forbidden
to transfer cases for consolidated trial.6 Nonetheless, through
manipulation of other venue statutes, the courts receiving the cases
consolidated by the Panel often decide on their own to retain the
cases for trial. Despite the benefits that may be realized from this
practice, Congress's scheme for multidistrict litigation does not
permit these courts to try the transferred actions. Moreover, the
"experts" in multidistrict litigation-the judges on the Panel-are
completely eliminated from the serious decision of whether to
consolidate for trial.
This Comment addresses the impropriety and shortcomings of
the ad hoc system developed by the courts to try the cases transferred for pretrial proceedings. Yet recognizing the advantages of
consolidated trial in some instances, this Comment urges modification of § 1407 to permit the Panel to consolidate cases for trial. Part
I provides a brief account of the events giving rise to the Panel's
creation. A short explanation of the Panel's purpose and operation
follows in Part II.7 Part I][I discusses techniques for terminating
litigation in the transferee forum. 8 Termination can occur through
dispositive motions during pretrial (Part III.A) or through trial in
the transferee forum (Part II.B). The benefits of consolidated trial
are reviewed in Part III.C.
Part IV.A analyzes the primary method of effecting trial in the
transferee court: using § 1404(a) 9 in conjunction with § 1407. It
demonstrates that this practice violates the legislative history,
5 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
6 See id. § 1407(a).
7 Because many fine articles comment on Panel "basics," see, e.g., Robert A. Cahn,
A Look At theJudicialPanel on MultidistrictLitigation, 72 F.R.D. 211, 212-19 (1977);
Wilson W. Herndon & Ernest R. Higginbotham, Complex MultidistrictLitigation-An
Overview of 28 U.S.C. § 1407, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 37-48 (1979); Levy, supra note
1, at 44-58; RobertJ. Ward, MultidistritLitigation Proceduresin the United States, 1982

TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 249, 250-54; Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen Woods Kolodgy,
Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. GIN. L.
REv. 467, 508-26 (1985), only the statutory essentials and a few more intimate aspects
of the Panel's operation will be discussed in this Comment.
8 The "transferee" forum is the district court to which individual actions are sent
for coordinated pretrial purposes. The "transferor" forum is the district court in
which an individual action is originally filed.
9 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
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language, and purpose of § 1407. Part IV.B shows that the
alternative trial technique-consent of the parties-is also highly
suspect under the present statutory scheme.
Beyond these
"legalistic" arguments, however, are practical problems with the
present system for obtaining consolidated trial. Part IV.C shows the
desirability of expanding the Panel's power to include transfer for
trial. Modifying § 1407 in this manner would, among other things,
permit an impartial, expert body--the Panel-to scrutinize the
appropriateness of consolidated trial, eliminate the rigid and
prohibitive limitations on transfer under § 1404(a), and increase the
flexibility in selecting the trial forum. This change would create a
highly pragmatic system for multidistrict litigation. Part V examines
how the Panel would wield its expanded power.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE PANEL
In the early 1960s federal courts were swamped with electrical
equipment antitrust cases. After successful criminal prosecutions of
the manufacturers, some 2,000 private damage actions were filed in
thirty-five federal district courts during a twelve-month period.1 0
Massive duplication of pretrial efforts was imminent, creating fears
of interminable discovery delays. In response, Chief Justice Earl
Warren, following a recommendation of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, created the Coordinating Committee for Multiple
Litigation of the United States District Courts (Coordinating
Committee)."' Using uniform pretrial and discovery orders,
national depositions, 12 and central document depositories, all of
the cases were concluded by 1967.13 The vice chairman of the
Coordinating Committee, Judge Edwin A. Robson, estimated that
See S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 3.
11 See id.
12 A "national deposition" is described in the Senate Report as follows:
10

National depositions were held, attended bylarge numbers of plaintiffs' and

defendants' counsel. Lead counsel, chosen by lawyers for the plaintiffs and
defendants, propounded questions on behalf of all the parties. Other
attorneys present, however, were given the opportunity to ask additional
questions to protect their particular interests. Arrangements were made fo
[sic] the additional deposition of any witness if the need arose.

Id.
13 See H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1899; S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 3-4. For a more complete discussion of the
disposition of the electrical equipment cases, see Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The
ElectricalEquipment Antitrust Cases: Novel JudicialAdministration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621
(1964).
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committee cases might have lingered for as long
without the ad hoc
14
years.
twenty
as
Although judges were quite pleased with the expeditious
termination of the electrical equipment cases, 15 the shortcomings
of the Coordinating Committee were readily evident. The procedure was inefficient. Often thirty or more district judges had to
coordinate their personal schedules to convene in one location to
discuss problems and meet with counsel. In addition, the voluntary
16
process hinged upon complete agreement among the judges.
The Coordinating Committee's members envisioned a legislatively
created judicial panel designed to deal efficiently with instances of
mass, multidistrict litigation. Their vision soon became a reality.
II.

CREATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE PANEL

In the spring of 1968, § 1407 was added to the United States
Judicial Code.1 7 Congress enacted into law, for the most part, the
blueprint drafted by the Coordinating Committee; 18 it created the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
A. The Statutory Scheme
The Panel consists of seven circuit and district court judges
19
chosen by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
The Panel is empowered to transfer to any federal district court
"civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact...
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." 20 Two
points warrant emphasis. First, the Panel can transfer an action to
any district; jurisdiction and venue objections will not prevent the
Panel from transferring a case. 2 1 Second, transfer is only for
14 See S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 6.

15 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION at vii (4th ed. 1977) (quoting from
ChiefJustice Earl Warren's address to the American Law Institute on May 16, 1967:

"'Our alarm was understandably great and makes equally understandable the measure
of my satisfaction in being able to report to the Institute at this meeting that every
single one of these cases has been terminated.'").
16 See S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 4.
17 See Act of Apr. 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296,82 Stat. 109 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988)).
18 See S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 4.
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1988). Although the appointment has no set term, a
judge usually sits for seven years. See Susan M. Olson, FederalMultidistrictLitigation:
Its Impact On Litigants, 13 JUST. SYs. J. 341, 343 (1988-89).
20 28 U.S.C § 1407(a).
21 See, e.g., In re Aircraft Accident at Barrow, Alaska on Oct. 13, 1978, 474 F.
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pretrial purposes.

When pretrial affairs are completed, the case

"shall be remanded ...
22

to the district from which it was trans-

ferred."
Proceedings to consolidate may- be initiated by the Panel sua
sponte2 3 or upon motion "by a party in any action in which transfer
may be appropriate." 24 After consolidation proceedings are
initiated, "the parties in all actions in which transfers ... are
...

contemplated" 25 receive notice of a hearing at which the issue of
transfer is argued. Consolidation is ordered "upon [the Panel's]
determination that transfers for such [coordinated and consolidated
pretrial] proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such
actions." 2 6 If a party disagrees with a Panel decision ordering
transfer, review is sought by extraordinary writ.2 7 An order
28
denying transfer for pretrial, however, is not reviewable.
Congress has granted the Panel authority to promulgate rules
"for the conduct of its business." 29 The Panel has adopted nineteen rules governing ministerial and
procedural aspects of its
30
involvement in multidistrict litigation.

Supp. 996, 999 (J.P.M.L. 1979) ("The Panel's discretion under Section 1407 is not
limited by venue considerations ... and the fact that defendants may not all be
amenable to suit in the samejurisdiction does not prevent transfer to a single district
for pretrial proceedings where the prerequisites of Section 1407 are otherwise
satisfied.").
22 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
23 See id. § 1407(c)(i).
24 Id. § 1407(c)(ii).
25 Id. § 1407(c).
26
Id. § 1407(a).
27 See id. § 1407(e). An extraordinary writ is requested pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (1988).
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e).
29 Id. § 1407(f). These rules, of course, must not be inconsistent with congressional acts or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.
'0 In addition to these nineteen rules, the Panel has adopted six more pertaining
to its authority under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2112(a)(3) (West Supp. 1991), to handle multiple
petitions instituted in the courts of appeals to review or enforce orders of administrative agencies. This Comment will not deal with the Panel's role in § 2112 proceedings.
The Panel's rules are reprinted in the United States Code immediately after 28
U.S.C. § 1407. Because the rules have been modified substantially since the 1988
edition of the Code, West's United States Code Annotated should be consulted. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 1407 app. (West Supp. 1991).
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B. The Panel in Action
1. The Mechanics of a Panel Session
Once every two months the Panel holds hearings to determine
if the matters before it should be consolidated for pretrial proceedings. 31 On a hearing day, the Panel entertains arguments in the
32
morning and retires to an executive meeting in the afternoon.
In a typical morning session, it hears oral argument on eight to
33
fifteen matters.
A "matter" is a group of closely related cases, ostensibly having
one or more common questions of fact, that are being considered
under a motion to consolidate. Because of the enormous number
of actions that may be transferred in one order, counsel in each
individual case is usually not heard.3 4 On each new matter, a
maximum of one-half hour of oral argument is permitted; parties
35
with different viewpoints are allotted equal amounts of time.
The Panel grants argument time sparingly and is very strict with its
time limits. 3 6 It keeps a stringent clock because lawyers often want

to argue the merits of their cases3 7 when the issues before the
31 See Howard, supra note 4, at 479.
32 See Telephone Interview with Patricia Howard, Clerk of the Panel (Jan. 10,
1991) [hereinafter Howard Interview I].
33 See id.
34 See Howard, supra note 4, at 480 (noting that 1600 actions were combined in
the Swine Flu Immunization Products Liability Litigation, 1100 in the A.H. Robins
Co. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, and 1100 in the RichardsonMerrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Products Liability Litigation (No. II)).
There may, however, be instances in which all counsel involved in the cases
under consideration will be heard. As few as two or three actions may be combined
and transferred for pretrial proceedings. See, e.g., In re Balcor Film Investors Sec.
Litig., No. 89-805, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13663 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 23, 1989) (consolidating two actions); In re AT&T Equip. Lease Contract Litig., No. 88-781, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17027 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 12, 1988) (consolidating three actions).
35 See R. PROC. J.P.M.L. 16(f). If the matter before the Panel is not new-that is,
a group of cases has already been transferred for pretrial and the Panel is considering
consolidation of additional cases in the same docket-a maximum of 20 minutes is
allowed for oral argument. See id. These late-arriving cases are known as "tag-along"
actions.
See infra note 43.
36
See David Lauter, MasteringMDL, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 21, 1983, at 1, 24 (noting
that "few people get more than five minutes" for oral argument). This article quotes
the clerk's announcement one day before hearings began: "'In docket 82, Mr.
Crabtree's time has been cut to five minutes... In docket 537, both counsel have
been cut to three minutes... Mr. Madole has two minutes; Mr. Dombroff has two
minutes; Mr. Charfoos, one minute'...." Id.; see also Howard Interview I, supra note
32 (stating that the Panel adheres strictly to its time allocations).
37 See Howard Interview I, supra note 32.
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Panel typically are narrow: do the actions warrant § 1407 treatment
and, if so, where is the appropriate transferee forum?"8 Although
these issues are fundamental in multidistrict litigation, they are
relatively straightforward; limited oral argument encourages counsel
to focus on the transfer issues. In special circumstances the Panel
will allow for more argument.3 9 A hearing on each matter is not
necessary, however, and oral argument is not encouraged. °
Sometimes parties waive oral argument, allowing the Panel to decide
a transfer motion on the basis of briefs.41
In the afternoon executive conference, the Panel discusses cases
argued in the morning session and addresses other pertinent
business. 42 A decision regarding transfer of "tag-along" actions is
usually made within a week. 43 Rulings on new matters may take
longer. The Panel cannot transfer cases, however, until it receives
consent from the proposed transferee court.44 Generally, the
entire process, from oral argument to transfer, is completed within
a month.4 5

38 The "transferee" and "transferor" forum are defined supra note 8.
3
9 See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 416
(J.P.M.L. 1991) (noting that a four hour hearingwas held on the question of transfer).
40 See R. PROC.J.P.M.L. 17 (noting that counsel must request oral argument and
may waive it).
41 See, e.g., In re Ross Capital Corp. Dividend-Capture Inv. Program Litig., No. 89811, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13661, at *2 n.1 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 16, 1989) (noting that
parties waived oral argument); In re Western Monetary Consultants, Inc., Sec. Litig.,
No. 89-804, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13659, at *1 n.1 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 14, 1989) (same);
In re Leitz Autofocus SLR Camera Patent Litig., No. 88-792, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17011,
at *2 n.2 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 5, 1988) (same).
42
See Telephone Interview with Patricia Howard, Clerk of the Panel (Jan. 30,
1991) [hereinafter Howard Interview II].
41 See id. A "tag-along" action is a case that is factually similar to several other
cases already transferred pursuant to § 1407. The tag-along claim is transferred to
the court that took the original matter and consolidated in the same docket for
pretrial. See R. PROC. J.P.M.L. 1 (defining tag-along action).
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (1988) ("With the consent of the transferee district
court, such [consolidated] actions may be assigned by the panel to ajudge orjudges
of such district."). Alternatively, a transferee judge maybe procured by assignment.
See id. ("[A] circuit judge or a district judge may be designated and assigned
temporarily for service in the transferee district by the Chief Justice of the United
States or the chief judge of the circuit ... in accordance with the provisions of
chapter 13 of this title.").
41 See Howard Interview II, supra note 42.
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2. Factors Influencing the Transfer Decision
In the Panel's early years, most of its decisions/orders were published. The Panel was resolving novel issues, and multidistrict
litigants needed its guidance. Since that time, the Panel has, for the
most part, simply applied the existing doctrine to issues arising
under § 1407. As a result, the Panel no longer publishes every
order.4 6 The decision to publish is made on a case-by-case basis. 47 To aid the consolidation of all claims related to the incident,
orders dealing with large numbers of victims, such as air crash
disasters or toxic torts, are typically published,4 8 as are orders
entailing new developments.
Thus, to find in-depth treatment of § 1407 issues, rulings from
the Panel's formative years must be consulted. Novel rulings do
exist 49 and the Panel's recent orders do offer rationales for their
conclusions, but the record of the late 1960s and 1970s is much
richer than that of recent years.5 0 The following skeletal treatment
of factors affecting transfer is best supplemented by Panel opinions
or law review articles from that period. 1
16 Most of the Panel's orders are available on the LEXIS and/or WESTLAW
databases.
47 See Howard Interview I, supra note 32.
48 See id.
" The recent transfer of the asbestos cases is testimony to the continuing
development of multidistrict litigation. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI),
771 F. Supp 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
50 Many early Panel decisions went beyond merely determining the propriety of
transfer in the matter under consideration. The decisions also construed § 1407,
defining its role and use. See, e.g., In re Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402 (J.P.M.L.
1969).
Recent transfer orders are ofaproforma nature and rarely deal with construing
§ 1407. Rather, the concern is whether the particular matter before the Panel should
be consolidated, and ifso, in which transferee forum. The orders are characteristically short and simple, stating merely the Panel's conclusion. The typical order consists
of four paragraphs. The first paragraph identifies the actions: "This litigation
presently consists of .... " The second paragraph reveals the decision on transfer:
"On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing held, the Panel finds .... " The
third paragraph identifies the transferee forum: "We are persuaded that [X] District
is the appropriate .... ." The fourth paragraph contains the order: "It is therefore
ordered that.. . ." For paradigmatic examples, see In re Balcor Film Investors Sec.
Litig., No. 89-805, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13663 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 23, 1989); In re Triad
Am. Energy Sec. Litig., No. 89-789, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13674 (J.P.M.L. Jan. 3,
1989). Of course, the order varies from this form when the Panel denies a transfer.
51 See, e.g., Herndon & Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 41-46 (citing numerous
cases expounding the statutory transfer factors); Levy, supranote 1, at 46-52 (same);
Note, TheJudicialPanel and the Conduct of MultidistrictLitigation, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1001, 1002-13 (1974) (same).
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a. PromotingJust and Efficient Conduct of the Actions Involved
The most influential factor in the transfer decision is whether a
saving in resources will result from consolidation. 52 On this score,
Congress was unambiguous: "The main purpose of transfer for
consolidation or coordination of pretrial proceedings is to promote
the ends of efficient justice .

. . ."5

"Efficient justice" is largely

oriented toward saving judicial resources, although litigants'
resources may be preserved simultaneously. 54 Efficient judicial
administration can be achieved by conducting the pretrial proceedings of related cases in one forum. The duplication of discovery that
would result from trying the actions individually can be avoided.
One judge can issue a single ruling on pretrial matters, avoiding
repeated rulings on the same issue and the possibility of conflicting
55
rulings by numerous judges.
Generally, pretrial consolidation will not conserve judicial
resources nor serve the interests of the litigants if the cases are
nearing trial in the transferor forum, or if discovery is well
along.5 6 In these circumstances the Panel often refuses to transfer
cases. In In re "LiteBeer" Trademark Litigation,5 7 for example, the
Panel, noting that "it appears from the parties' representations...
that discovery is substantially completed in the Schlitz and Peter
Hand actions and that both actions are nearing trial," concluded:
"Under these circumstances, transfer will not further the purposes
"
of section 1407. 58

52 This is not surprising as such a concern gave rise to § 1407. Seesupranotes 1014 and accompanying text.
53 S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 2; see also H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 2,
at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1900 ("It is expected that such transfer is to be
ordered only where significant economy and efficiency injudicial administration may
be obtained.").
" See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
55 SeeIn reAir Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 476 F. Supp. 445,447 (J.P.M.L. 1979)
(listing benefits derived from consolidated pretrial); see also Herndon &
Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 45 (listing six factors which the Panel uses to justify
a finding that consolidation will promote efficiency).
56 Cf.Suggested ProceduresforMultidistrictLitigation, 124 F.R.D. 488,489-90 (1989)
("The early identification of multidistrict litigation is essential to insure that the full
value of coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings is realized ...
57 437 F. Supp. 754 (J.P.M.L. 1977).
5
1Id.at 755; see also In re National Master Freight Agreement Drug Testing Litig.,
No. 88-769, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17036, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 15, 1988) (denying
consolidation because discovery had been completed in the three individual actions);
In re Royal Regency, Mt. Vernon, Bishops Glen, North River & Mount Royal Towers
Sec. Litig., No. 88-770, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17035, at *2 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 15, 1988)
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b. Convenience of Partiesand Witnesses
The Coordinating Committee draft of the multidistrict litigation
statute did not include "convenience of parties and witnesses" as a
factor in the transfer decision; this provision was added by Congress
in § 1407(a). The Senate Committee on theJudiciary noted that the
"amendment makes it clear that the convenience of parties and
witnesses shall be weighed as a factor in determining whether
59
transfer should be made."
In practice, the weight accorded the convenience factor has been
minuscule. 60
The Panel's failure to heed this congressional
admonishment prompted one commentator to remark that "the
Panel has assumed-and routinely rules without further explanation-that transfer of an action which meets the other statutory
requirements will be for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses, despite the protests of counsel and parties." 61 Indeed,
62
the Panel may consolidate even if all parties in the matter object.
Despite inconveniences to individual litigants, benefits may
accrue to the parties collectively as a result of consolidation. In
litigation where documents abound, central depositories can greatly
reduce the overall cost of duplication, and common depositions may
save hundreds of hours of the attorneys' and deponents' time. If
"convenience" is viewed from a group perspective, the Panel may be

satisfying § 1407's command that transfers be "for the convenience
of parties and witnesses" more often than some commentators
63
imply.
(listing the well-advanced status of pretrial proceedings as a strike against transfer);
In re Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402, 1405 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (consolidating some
related cases but refusing to transfer actions against one defendant because discovery
was nearly complete and the cases were ready for trial).
59 S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 2.
60 Herndon & Higginbotham state that "the Panel has largely eliminated this
guideline as a determinative standard." Herndon & Higginbotham, supra note 7, at
43.
61 Herndon & Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 44.
62 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1505, 1513
(D. Colo. 1989) ("Courts may order consolidation of cases without consent and over
the objections of parties.").
63 In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), may help
elucidate the concept of "convenience" in the multidistrict litigation context. Like
§ 1407, transfer of a case for all purposes under § 1404(a) must be "[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses." In light of this phrase, the district court
stated:
The court is not considering the transfer of one case from one district to
another but rather the transfer and consolidation of 32 cases filed in twelve

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

1991]

c. Actions Involving One or More Common Questions of Fact

The statutory requirement that cases must involve common
questions of fact poses no barrier when the Panel deems transfer
proper. A common question of fact in the related cases is not
difficult to identify. "[T]he cases suggest that if the Panel feels the
matter should be consolidated under section 1407, common
questions of fact will be found to exist in order to justify the
transfer." 64 In sum, the Panel has wide latitude to transfer cases
it believes will be beneficially handled through consolidated pretrial
proceedings.

65

3. Choosing the Transferee Forum
The liveliest topic at most Panel proceedings is the debate over
the appropriate transferee forum. Not uncommonly, the parties
and the Panel will agree that consolidation is proper, but will
vehemently disagree as to the best transferee court. 66 Although

districts into one district for trial. Thus, instead of looking to the individual
convenience of each party and each witness, the court must look to the
overall convenience of all parties and witnesses.
Id. at 304 (footnote omitted).
In the § 1407 context, the Panel has held:
Of course itis to the interest of each plaintiff to have all of the proceedings
in his suit handled in his district. But the Panel must weigh the interests of
all the plaintiffs and all the defendants, and must consider multiple
litigation as a whole in the light of the purposes of the law.
In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 386 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
64 Levy, supra note 1, at 48 (citing In re Fourth Class Postage Regulations, 298 F.
Supp. 1326 (J.P.M.L. 1969) and In re Air Fare Litig., 322 F. Supp. 1013 (J.P.M.L.
1971)). Although the primary issue in both of these cases was one of law, the Panel
"rationalized its decision [to transfer] by saying that it was necessary to discover the
underlying or surrounding facts." Id.; see also Herndon & Higginbotham, supra note
7, at 42 (reporting that as of 1979 not a single decision by the Panel denied transfer
for lack of common factual questions).
65 There are two additional objective requirements for § 1407(a) consolidation:
the cases must be civil actions and they must be pending in differentjudicial districts.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
66 See Air FareLitig., 322 F. Supp. at 1015 ("As is so often the case, the real issue
among the parties is not whether these actions should be transferred under Section
1407 but rather to which district they should be transferred."); see also In re Balcor
Film Investors Sec. Litig., No. 89-805, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13663, at *1 (J.P.M.L.
Aug. 23, 1989) (noting that all parties agreed to centralization, but differed as to
forum); In re Air Disaster near Honolulu, Hawaii, on Feb. 24, 1989, No. 89-807, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13665, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 14, 1989) (same); In re Wirebound Boxes
Antitrust Litig., No. 88-793, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17015, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Nov. 29,
1988) (same).

722

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:711

Congress provided loose statutory guidelines for ordering a transfer,
it gave the Panel no guidance for deciding where to transfer.
Theoretically, § 1407 permits the Panel to consolidate a case in the
Southern District of New York with a case in the Eastern District of
New York (all components of the cases located in New York) and
transfer them to Alaska for pretrial, though no such order will be
found in the Panel's records.
The Panel has developed its own general guidelines for selecting
the transferee forum, taking in to account both the desires of the
parties and the specific facts of the cases. A variety of factors may
be considered in the forum decision process. The more influential
include the parties' principal places of business, 67 the number of
cases pending in a given district,68 the location of documents and
witnesses, 69 whether discovery is at an advanced stage in one of
the districts, 70 and the convenience of the parties. 7 1 Of course, a
myriad of additional considerations also exist. 72 The Panel will
cite a combination of the foregoing and sundry other factors when
determining the appropriate forum.
67 See In re Revco/Anac Sec. Litig., No.90-851, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13981, at
*3 (J.P.M.L. Sept. 7, 1990); In re Incepts, Inc., No. 88-772, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17037, at *3-4 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 17, 1988).
68 See In re Commercial Gen. Liab. Ins. Antitrust Litig., No. 88-767,1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17033, at *3 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 30, 1988) (noting that more than half of the
actions in the litigation were pending in the chosen transferee district); In re "Sabre"
Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust & Contract Litig., No. 88-761,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17046, at *3 (J.P.M.L. June 7, 1988) (noting that 32 of the 40
actions in the matter were pending in the transferee forum).
69 See BalcorFilm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13663, at *2 (noting that the majority of
the corporate defendants' documents and witnesses were located in Chicago, within
100 miles of the transferee courthouse); In re Dun & Bradstreet Commercial Credit
Info. Servs. Litig., No. 89-806, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13660, at *3 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 14,
1989) (noting that relevant documents could be found within or near the chosen
transferee forum).
70 See In re Terra-Drill Partnerships Sec. Litig., No. 89-791, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13670, at *2 (J.P.M.L. May 8, 1989) (noting that discovery was "well under way" in the
transferee forum); In re Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. Employees Benefit Litig., No.
89-798, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13673, at *2 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 2, 1989) (noting that
"extensive" discovery had taken place in the transferee court).
71 See In re Air Disaster near Honolulu, Hawaii, on Feb. 24, 1989, No. 89-807,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13665, at *2 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 14, 1989) ("We note that this
district is conveniently located for many parties and witnesses .... .");In re Triad Am.
Energy Sec. Litig., No. 89-789, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13674, at *2 (J.P.M.L. Jan. 3,
1989) (noting that the chosen transferee forum would "best serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses").
72 For lists of additional factors, see Herndon & Higginbotham, supra note 7, at
47, and Levy, supra note 1, at 57.
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4. Cases Commonly Consolidated
Actions of any nature may be transferred by the Panel. The
most routinely consolidated matters, however, are antitrust cases,
securities litigation, products liability suits, and air crash disaster
claims. 73 This is unsurprising; litigation of this sort frequently
involves large numbers of litigants, and the Panel was created to
handle such matters efficiently.
III.

TERMINATION IN THE TRANSFEREE FORUM

Section 1407 requires individual cases to be remanded to their
respective transferor courts upon completion of pretrial proceedings in the transferee forum. 74 The Panel holds this remand
power, although in practice it will not remand without approval by
the transferee judge.75 There is, however, a "hidden" proviso in
§ 1407(a) which may preclude remand: "Each action so transferred
shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred
unless it shall have been previously teminated ....

"76

A. PretrialTermination by the TransfereeJudge
Transfereejudges have paid substantial allegiance to the proviso.
Hundreds of § 1407-transferred cases have not returned to their
transferor courts. The House Committee on the Judiciary initially
suggested one method to dispose of consolidated actions in the
73 The Senate report on § 1407 suggested that these types of matters would be
particularly susceptible to transfer. See S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 7. That
foresight has come to fruition.
Examples of other consolidated claims include patent litigation, see In re Burke,
Inc., Personal Mobility Vehicle Patent Litig., No. 89-809,1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13662
(J.P.M.L. Aug. 22, 1989), suits involving investments, see In re Ross Capital Corp.
Dividend-Capture Inv. Program Litig., No. 89-811, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13661
(J.P.M.L. Aug. 16, 1989), and actions regarding insurance, see In re Chubb Corp.
Drought Ins. Litig., No. 88-782, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17026 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 13, 1988).
74 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
75
See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 606 F. Supp.
715, 716 (J.P.M.L. 1985) (remanding cases with support of transferee judge and
reiterating fact that the Panel is "greatly influenced by the transferee judge's
suggestion that remand is appropriate"); In re Evergreen Valley Project Litig., 435 F.
Supp. 923, 924 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (noting that the transferee judge plays a key role in
the remand decision); R. PROC. J.P.M.L. 14(d) ("The Panel is reluctant to order
remand absent a suggestion of remand from the transferee district court.").
76 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
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transferee forum: summary judgment. 77 Transferee judges soon
recognized others. Judge Stanley Weigel, a former member of the
Panel, compiled the following list:
It is generally accepted that a transferee judge has authority to
decide all pretrial motions, including motions that may be
dispositive, such as motions for judgment approving a settlement,
for dismissal, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary
judgment, for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), for striking
an affirmative defense, for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)
78
and to quash service of process.
For the most part, use of these disposal techniques is non-controversial. The statute itself recognizes the possibility of termination
during pretrial proceedings, 79 and to effectuate termination the
transferee judge must be empowered to decide dispositive motions.
An example of the propriety, and perhaps necessity, of pretrial
disposal is evident in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation.80
Hundreds of claims against manufacturers of Agent
Orange, a herbicide used in Vietnam, were transferred to Judge Jack
Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York. The Panel consolidated many of these cases, and others came from state courts. After
five years of litigation, the parties agreed to a $180 million settlement. In addition, Judge Weinstein granted summary judgment
against all plaintiffs who opted out of the certified class. It would
have been an awkward situation and a waste ofjudicial time if'Judge
Weinstein had not possessed power to approve the settlement offer.
Presumably, each case would have been remanded to its transferor
court, and each judge therein would have had to individually
approve the settlement offer. Greater difficulty and confusion
would have arisen if on remand some judges rejected the settlement
offer. Remanding for transferor court approval would create the
problem encountered by the Coordinating Committee; settlement
approval would hinge upon complete agreement among a multitude
77 See H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.G.C.A.N. at
1900.
78 Stanley A. Weigel, TheJudicialPanelon MultidistrictLitigation, TransferorCourts
and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575,582-83 (1978) (footnotes omitted). The omitted
footnotes cite cases upholding the power of the transferee judge to rule on each of
the listed motions.
79 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
80 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd in part and rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226
(2d Cir. 1987).
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of district court judges.8 1 Use of the remand process to seek
approval of settlement offers would be time consuming and perhaps
unsuccessful.8 2
For many of the same reasons, the advantages of summary
judgment power are apparent. If the transferee judge deems
summaryjudgment appropriate, there would be a waste of resources
to require remand to each transferor judge for reconsideration of
the identical issue. The transferorjudges would have to be familiarized with the case, the files would need to be retransferred, the
possibility of diverse rulings by transferor judges would be created,
and the potential for several appeals in different circuits on the
same issue would exist.
It is also evident that a transferee court needs the ability to rule
on a motion to dismiss. If this capability did not exist, the transferee court would be placed in a compromising position. It might
refuse to remand, 3 forge ahead with discovery, and hope the
motion to dismiss will be denied by the transferorjudges. But if on
remand the transferor courts grant the motion to dismiss, valuable
time and resources spent in discovery will go for naught. On the
other hand, the transferee court might immediately recommend
remand in the hope that the motion to dismiss will be granted. But
if the transferor courts deny the motion to dismiss the cases would
be sent back to the transferee court. Moreover, the transferor
judges might rule differently upon the motion. At least two
unnecessary and time consuming transfers are precluded by
permitting the transferee judge to rule upon the motion to dismiss.84

In sum, it is highly desirable for a single transferee judge to
entertain summary judgment motions and motions to dismiss, and
to decide other dispositive issues in pretrial proceedings. Congress
recognized this desirability, at least implicitly, when § 1407 was in
85
the process of enactment.
81 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

82 Transferee judges have approved settlement in other huge multidistrict
litigations. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 526 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1981).
8s Recall that although the Panel ultimately holds the power to remand, it is
reluctant to do so without support from the transfereejudge. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
84 For a recent example of a transferee court ruling on motions to dismiss, see
Majeski v. Balcor Entertainment Co. Ltd., 740 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
85 See H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1900 ("[T]he term 'pretrial proceedings' [refers] to the practice and procedure which
precede the trial of an action. These generally involve deposition and discovery, and
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B. Termination by Trial in the Transferee Forum

Despite the design of § 1407-that cases be remanded after
pretrial is completed-the vast majority of cases are never remanded.
From September 1968 to June 1988, nearly 15,000 actions were
processed by the Panel.8 6 Only eighteen percent of these cases
were remanded to their transferor courts. 87 Some of the actions
ended by summary judgment, settlement, or other pretrial disposal
in the transferee court, preventing the possibility of remand. A

significant number, however, were not (and are not) remanded
because the cases are retained by the transferee judge for trial.88
This is accomplished in one of two ways "89 the transferee court
orders transfer for all purposes under § 1404(a)90 or, alternatively,
parties consent to trial in the transferee forum. Section 1404(a)'s
role in multidistrict litigation is elaborated immediately below. Trial
by consent in the transferee forum is self-explanatory; after the
Panel transfers a matter pursuant to § 1407, the parties agree to
have the transferee judge proceed with trial.

...

are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure....

Under the Federal

rules the transferee district court would have authority to render summaryjudgment
86 See Howard, supra note 4, at 480.
87 See id. One commentator, writing in the early 1980s, noted that "slightly less
than five percent of the actions transferred by the Panel have been remanded." See
Ward, supra note 7, at 256.
88 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979, 476 F.
Supp. 445,450 (J.P.M.L. 1979) ("[Mlost actions transferred pursuant to Section 1407
are not remanded to their transferor districts, either because the actions are
terminated prior to trial by settlement or otherwise in the transferee district, or
because the actions are transferred by the transferee court under Sections 1404(a) or
1406.-).
89 Transferee courts may also acquire cases for trial by using 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)
(1988). This venue statute provides:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest ofjustice,
transfer such a case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.
Id. Sections 1406(a) and 1404(a) are quite similar; therefore, § 1406(a) will not be
treated as an independent method to achieve trial in the transferee forum. There is,
however, an important distinction between these statutes. When § 1404(a) is used,
a case is being removed from a forum in which the plaintiff was entitled to bring his
claim. But, a case transferred pursuant to § 1406(a) could not have remained in the
original forum. If not transferred, the case would be dismissed.
9o See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
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1. The Use of Section 1404(a) to Effectuate Trial
in the Transferee Court
Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought." 9 1 This statute, which existed before and is unrelated to
§ 1407,92 permits a district court to transfer a case to another
court for all purposes-pretrial and trial. Judges may use it
independently of § 1407 to consolidate similar actions in one court
for trial. Discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) rests with the court
in which an action is originally filed.9 3 This discretionary aspect
of § 1404(a) 94 can obstruct the consolidation of all related cases in
a single forum. Some judges may transfer cases while others may
95

not.

When used in conjunction with § 1407, however, § 1404(a)
discretion rests solely with the transferee judge. The use of
§ 1404(a) in the multidistrict context to achieve trial in the
transferee court involves two simple steps.
First, the Panel
consolidates claims under § 1407, sending all cases in the matter to
one transferee court for pretrial. Then, during pretrial, a party
makes a § 1404(a) motion for transfer of venue. If the transferee
judge grants this motion the actions will stay in the transferee court
for trial.

91

Id.

92 Section 1404(a) was enacted in 1948. See Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat.

937. Section 1407 was enacted in 1968. See Act of Apr. 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296,

82 Stat. 109.
93 See Stewart Org. Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) ("[T]he statute is
intended to place discretion in the district courts to adjudicate motions for transfer
according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and
fairness."); Vanguard Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Johnson, 736 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
("The resolution of a 1404(a) motion to transfer rests within the sound discretion of
the district court.").

9 This is an important distinction between § 1404(a) and § 1407. Under the
latter, if the Panel deems transfer beneficial, all related cases will be combined;
consolidation does not depend on the transferorjudges whose cases are affected by
the Panel's order.

" It is also possible that courts do not know of related actions in other districts
to which a case could be transferred for consolidated proceedings.
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2. Transferee Courts and Section 1404(a):
The Historical Development
When § 1407 was enacted, Congress did not envision trial of
§ 1407-consolidated matters in the transferee court. Although it
was aware that § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) could aid multidistrict
litigation, it did not foresee these statutes being utilized by the
transferee judge. 9 6 Even so, it did not take long for the Panel and
transferee judges to use the statutes in combination with § 1407 to
achieve trial in the transferee forum.
During the Panel's first two years, the ability of transfereejudges
to employ § 1404(a) was uncertain. In In re Mid-Air Collision Near
Hendersonville, North Carolina on July 19, 1967,97 the Panel trans-

ferred cases to North Carolina for pretrial despite a pending
§ 1404(a) motion in the Missouri district court (the transferor
forum). The defendant argued thatJudge Collinson, the transferor
judge, should rule on the § 1404(a) motion before the Panel
transferred the cases for pretrial. If the motion was granted, the
defendant noted, a § 1407 transfer would be unnecessary. Refusing
to wait forJudge Collinson's ruling, the Panel stated, "[c]ounsel for
the plaintiffs.., point out quite correctly thatJudge Collinson may
consider transfer of the cases for trial under Section 1404(a)
following completion of pretrial proceedings."9 8 The Panel did
not suggest that the North Carolina transferee judge could decide
99
the pending § 1404(a) motion.
96 See S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 2, at 3-4,
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1900, 1902.
97 297 F. Supp. 1039 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
98 Id. at 1040.

99 The Panel again discussed the interplay of § 1404(a) and § 1407 in In re Air
Crash Disaster at Falls City, Nebraska on August 6, 1966,298 F. Supp. 1323 (J.P.M.L.

1969). It stated:
An added factor that militates against a transfer at this time under Section

1407 is the outstanding and substantial venue and service question still
unresolved in the Illinois, Texas and Nebraska District Court actions. Such
undetermined issues will not be resolved by a transfer under Section 1407,
whereas transfers to the Southern District of New York under Section 1406,
if warranted, will resolve the venue and service problems now existing in

some of those cases; in others, transfer may be effected under Section
1404(a). Thus, where appropriate, consolidation and coordination of all

these cases for all purposes may be achieved by transfers under Section
1406 in some cases and under Section 1404(a) in others.
Id. at 1324 (footnotes omitted). Unlike Hendersonville, the Panel postponed a § 1407

transfer decision because of potential consolidationfor all purposesunder § 1404(a)
or § 1406. But like Hendersonville,it did not imply that parties could bring § 1404(a)
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In In re Grain Shipments1 ° ° the Panel provided a more pointed

discussion of the relationship between § 1407 and § 1404(a). And
it seemingly limited use of § 1404(a) to the transferor court:
Section 1407 is not the exclusive vehicle for insuring the just and
efficient conduct of cases having common questions of fact and
law. Sections 1404(a), and 1406(a) when applicable, may be used
in conjunction with or in place of Section 1407 to transfer related
cases to a single court. It should be emphasized that the transfer
of these cases under Section 1407 does not prevent the appropriate
court from considering the possibility of transferring these cases
for trial under Section 1404(a) when pretrial proceedings are com0
plete.'

By "appropriate court," the Panel could only have meant the
transferor forum.10 2 Soon after Grain Shipments, however, the
Panel's understanding of the relation between the statutes shifted.
In In re Koratron,10 3 the Panel declared that "[s]ections 1404(a),
1406(a), and 1407 are not mutually exclusive and, when appropriate,
should be used in concert to effect the most expeditious disposition
10 4
of multidistrict litigation."
In 1971, § 1407 and § 1404(a) were used in combination to
effectuate transferee court trial for the first time. 10 5 In the previous year the Panel had clarified its position when it promulgated
Rule 15(d):
Actions will be remanded to the district from which they were
transferred unless an order has been signed by the designated
and § 1406 motions before the transferee court. On the contrary, the Panel said:
"Such undetermined issues will not be resolved by a transfer under Section
1407. ... " Id. (emphasis added).
'00 300 F. Supp. 1402 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
101 Id. at 1404 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
102Although "appropriate court" was not expressly defined, logically, it could only
mean the transferor court. It would be impossible under § 1407 for a transferee
court to handle a § 1404(a) motion "when pretrial proceedings are complete" because
at the conclusion of pretrial the cases must be remanded unless previously
terminated. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
103 302 F. Supp. 239 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
104 Id. at 242.
105 The first use of § 1407 in conjunction with another venue statute occurred in
1969. In Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Il. 1969),
the transferee court found that two cases before it were originally filed in an
improper venue (i.e. venue in the transferor forum was improper). Rather than
remanding the cases to the transferor forum at the conclusion of pretrial, it
transferred the actions, using § 1406, to districts in which they could have been
brought. See id. at 1211; see also supra note 89 (explaining § 1406(a)). It did not
transfer the cases to itself for trial.
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transferee judge transferring an action to another district under
28 U.S.C. 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. 1406(a). Such actions will be
remanded by the Panel to the district designated in the section
06
1404(a) or section 1406(a) order.1
In In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 10 7 the role of § 1404(a) in
§ 1407 proceedings was directly at issue. The court considered
"whether this judge, as a transferee judge, has the authority to
transfer actions transferred to the court under section 1407 to
another district under section 1404(a)." 10 8 It answered in the
affirmative, reasoning that § 1407 did not "in any way limit the
normal authority of a district court." 10 9 The court viewed a
motion to transfer as a pretrial motion that "generally should be
determined prior to the completion of discovery." 110 Finally the
court stated:
Any other holding would create an anomalous situation for the
Panel has held that from the time of entry of its order of transfer
until the time of entry of an order of remand, the transferor court
is without jurisdiction and can issue no further orders. In re
Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F.Supp. 484, 486 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit.
1968). Thus, if the transferee judge cannot make a section 1404(a)
...transfer, no court can and . . . section[] 1404(a) ...

will have

been temporarily suspended by section 1407. That surely cannot
111
have been the intent of Congress.
One defendant vehemently protested and petitioned the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing Judge
R. PROC.J.P.M.L. 15(d), reprintedin 50 F.R.D. 203 (1970). The current version
of this rule states:
Each transferred action that has not been terminated in the transferee court
shall be remanded by the Panel to the transferor district for trial, unless
ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or other
district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406. In the event that
the transferee judge transfers an action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406,
no further action of the Panel shall be necessary to authorize further
proceedings including trial.
R. PROC. J.P.M.L. 14(b) (note change in rule number).
107 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
108 Id. at 302.
0
1 9 Id. at 303. Judge Lord, the transferee judge, felt it would be anomalous to
conclude that transferee judges have less power than transferor judges. Because
transferor judges clearly can rule on § 1404(a) motions, it followed that transferee
judges should be able to do the same.
110 Id.
111 Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted).
106
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Lord to vacate his § 1404(a) transfer order. 112
The Second
Circuit refused to grant the writ, holding that a transferee judge
1 13
could use § 1404(a) to consolidate cases for trial.
After promulgation of Rule 15(d) and the Pfizer decision (which
was buttressed by contemporaneous cases1 1 4 ) everyone-parties,
courts,1 15 and commentatorsll 6-fell in line; the 1407-1404(a)
combination was legitimized.
C. Advantages of Trial in the Transferee Court
The 1407-1404(a) combination did not develop arbitrarily and
parties do not consent to trial in the transferee forum capriciously.
Trial in the transferee court is ordered or consented to because it
promotes efficient judicial administration and/or is in the interest
of litigants. Certainly consolidated trial of every multidistrict
litigation is not warranted, but it is often advantageous, and on
occasion imperative.
After spending weeks, or even months, governing pretrial stages
of a matter, a judge acquires an unparalleled familiarity with the
litigation. This familiarity can enhance the smooth and speedy
processing of cases through trial. The sentiments of Judge Bownes
elucidate this point strikingly:
This multidistrict litigation was assigned to me on June 1,
1970, and since that time I have been actively engaged in the
supervision of the pretrial preparation of all of the cases arising

112

See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1971).

13 See id. at 124-25. The court agreed with Judge Lord that an anomaly would

result if "all proceedings on any section 1404(a) motion would have to be suspended
for the entire period of pretrial." Id. at 125. Moreover, permitting the transferee
judge to rule on § 1404(a) motions would promote the just and efficient conduct of
the litigation; it would avoid remand to several district courts where separate
§ 1404(a) rulings would be made. See id.
114 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, New Hampshire on October 25,
1968,342 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.H. 1971);Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F. Supp.

121 (N.D. Ca. 1971).
115 Three years after Pfizer, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals spoke of the

procedure without comment. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 402
(7th Cir. 1974) (noting that the cases had been transferred for pretrial under § 1407
and consolidated for all purposes by the transferee court with the aid of § 1404(a)),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 586 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.
1978).
116 One writer mentioned in passing the possibility that using § 1404(a) after a
§ 1407 transfer was inappropriate. SeeJohn F. Cooney, Comment, The Experience of
Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 588, 606
(1972).
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out of the crash in Hanover, New Hampshire. I think it is fair to
conclude that I have a working familiarity with the facts, issues,
and problems involved. While it would be easy on me, as well as
for me, to transfer the cases back to their transferor districts on
the completion of pretrial discovery, such transfers would be an
abdication of responsibility on my part and would constitute, in
this era of congested calendars and long delays of trials, an 7affront
to the orderly and expeditious administration ofjusticeY1
The federal court system has yet to exit the "era of congested
118
calendars and long delays of trials."
In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions n1 9 further demonstrates the
efficacy of trial in the transferee forum. Judge Lord, sitting in the
Southern District of New York, conducted pretrial in several cases
transferred to him by the Panel. Near completion of pretrial, he
was assigned, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(c), 120 to the Northern
District of California to try seven of the consolidated cases that had
been filed there originally. 12 1 Three inefficiencies are associated
with this assignment procedure. First, using § 292(d) is a time
consuming process. When used in § 1407 proceedings, cooperation
and communication among the Panel, the district judge to be
assigned, the chief judge of the assignee circuit, and the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court are required. 22 Second, judges have dockets to manage in their own courts. Sending
them to distant forums for the benefit of litigants in those districts
is at the expense of litigants in the judge's home district. Third, if
cases are remanded to several districts at the conclusion of pretrial,
it could take months, or years, for a judge to travel to each

117 Hanover, 342 F. Supp. at 908. The advantage of getting the transferee judge
in a position to conduct trial has been recognized on other occasions. See, e.g., In re
Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979,476 F. Supp. 445,450 n.5
(J.P.M.L. 1979) (noting that the Panel had recently aided two transferee judges in
obtaining intercircuit assignments so they could try the remanded actions).
118 Hanover, 342 F. Supp. at 908.
119 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y 1971).
120 See 28 U.S.C. § 292(d) (1988) (note change in subsection letter).
121 The Panel had earlier recognized that § 292(d) might be used to get the
transferee judge in the transferor forum. See In re CBS Color Tube Patent Litig., 329
F. Supp. 540,541 n.3 (J.P.M.L. 1971) (stating that "it would be possible to temporarily
assign the judge familiar with the litigation to any district in which a trial is to be
held").
122 One commentator has suggested that a simple motion by the transfereejudge
to the Pancl at the conclusion of pretrial could replace the current assignment
process. See Ward, supranote 7, at 258-59. This procedure, however, would not quell
the other problems with assignment.
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transferor district to conduct trial. All the problems attendant to
intercircuit assignments are avoided by allowing a judge to try the
cases in his own court. Even if these inefficiencies are not bothersome, the practice of assigning judges lends credence to the
proposition in this subpart: it is often desirable to get the pretrial
judge in a position to conduct trial.
The second, and more pressing, problem exposed by Antibiotic
Antitrust is the difficulty of trying one case independently from the
rest of the actions in a matter. Ultimately, Judge Lord's special
assignment to California went unused. The actions were so complex
and intertwined that trial of the seven cases apart from the others
was impossible. 123 In complicated matters a workable trial plan
may require consolidation in a single forum.
Trial in the transferee forum produces additional benefits. One
trial in the transferee court replaces several trials of the same issues
in various transferor courts. Savings in transactional costs and the
parties', witnesses', and courts' time are also realized. Conflicting
decisions by transferor courts after remand are avoided1 24 as are
multiple appeals from these decisions.1 25 Finally, the task of
126
transferring case files back to transferor courts is avoided.

123 See Antibiotic Antitrust, 333 F. Supp. at 301 ("[S]ince these overlaps and
conflicts cannot.., be resolved prior to trial, it has become increasingly clear that
they can only be satisfactorily resolved by a coordinated or consolidated trial or trials
in one district directed by the judge who is most familiar with this massive
litigation.").
124 See Sherrill P. Hondorf, A Mandate for the ProceduralManagement of Mass

Exposure Litigation, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 541, 557 (1989) (noting that remand can lead
to inconsistent verdicts on the same issue).
125 Choice of law rules can result in multiple appeals even within the transferee
circuit, which may or may not affect the desirability of consolidated trial.
For a discussion of choice of law problems in multidistrict litigation, see Joan
Steinman, Law of the Case: A JudicialPuzzle in Consolidatedand TransferredCases and
in MultidistrictLitigation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 662-706 (1987).

126 More is involved in transferring files than simply dropping them in the mail.
See R. PRoc. J.P.M.L. 19 (outlining the process of transferring files in multidistrict
litigation). The burdensome nature of this chore was recognized by the Panel in the
In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991),
when it suspended Rule 19 to keepJudge Weiner's head above a sea of 26,000 case
files. See id. at 424 & n.12. He is permitted to request from transferor courts the
files he wishes to examine. See id. at 424 n.12.
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PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PROCESS FOR OBTAINING TRIAL
IN THE TRANSFEREE FORUM

IV.

Although benefits are realized through consolidated trial of
certain multidistrict litigations, Congress designed § 1407 so that it
would not affect the place of trial in any case. The House and
Senate Committees on the judiciary articulated four specific reasons
why they did not allow for trial consolidation through § 1407.127
This Part is divided into three Subparts. Subpart A provides a
detailed examination of the legislative history, language, and
purpose of § 1407, demonstrating that a transferee court's use of
§ 1404(a) sets Congress's carefully crafted plan for multidistrict
litigation on its head. Subpart B scrutinizes the validity of consenting to trial in the transferee court. This practice also conflicts with
the design of § 1407 and is rendered suspect by the Supreme
Court's ruling in Hoffman v. Blaski.128 Even if transferee courts
could legitimately utilize § 1404(a) or ratify litigants' consent, there
are numerous concerns with these methods of procuring cases for
trial. Amending § 1407 to permit the Panel to make the decision
whether the cases should be consolidated for trial would lend
fairness and flexibility to multidistrict litigation. An impartial,
expert body would be involved in the decision, the limitations of
§ 1404(a) would be avoided, and the choice of trial forums would be
expanded. Subpart C addresses these issues. The analysis in this
Part, combined with the observation that trial in the transferee
court can be advantageous (or even necessary), leads to the
conclusion that § 1407 needs to be revised.
A. Transferee Court's Use of Section 1404(a) is Prohibited
Judge Lord, in Antibiotic Antitrust, asserted:
There is absolutely no reason to believe that the district judge to
whom a case has been assigned under section 1407 has any less
authority or power as to matters preceding the actual trial of a

First, the experience of the Coordinating Committee for the electrical
equipment antitrust cases was limited to pretrial and it was deemed desirable to stay
within those bounds. Second, from the standpoint of parties and witnesses, trial in
the original forum is generally preferable. Third, it may be impracticable for one
transferee court to try all the cases in mass litigation. Fourth, local discovery will
probably be necessary to supplement coordinated discovery. See S. REP. No. 454,
supra note 2, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1900-02.
128 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
127
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case than would a judge before whom the case was originally
12 9
filed.
To the contrary, there are several reasons.
1. Legislative History of Section 1407
The Senate's and House of Representative's final reports on
§ 1407 make clear that remand is to occur when pretrial is completed.1 30 The most telling indication of congressional intent is the
following statement from the reports: "if proposed section 1407
should be enacted and future experience justifies extending it to
include consolidation and coordinationfor trialpurposes as well, only
minor amendments to the present language of the bill will be
necessary."13 1
It is not by happenstance that § 1407 permits
pretrial transfer only; Congress considered allowing consolidation
for trial as well, but decided not to permit such transfers and gave
explicit reasons for its conclusion. A transferee court's use of
§ 1404(a) achieves precisely what Congress did not allow-trial in the
transferee court. Congressional amendment, notjudicial proclamation, is necessary for consolidated cases properly to be tried in the
transferee forum.
The legislative history clearly reflects an understanding that
§ 1407 cannot effect a change in the location of trial. Several letters
included in the Senate Report mention the "temporary" nature of
a transfer.13 2 Section 1407 was the brainchild of the Coordinating
Committee for the electrical equipment antitrust cases.133 In its
report on then proposed § 1407, the Committee declared:

129 Antibiotic Antitrust, 333 F. Supp. at 303.

110 See S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 5 (proclaiming that "[plaragraph (a) [of
§ 1407] also requires transferred cases to be remanded to the originating district at
the close of coordinated pretrial proceedings. The bill does not, therefore, include
the trial of cases in the consolidated proceedings."); H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note
2, at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1901 (same).
131 S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 5 (emphasis added). The House Report
contains identical language. See H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 2, at 4, reprintedin
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1902.
132 See Letter from William E. Foley toJames 0. Eastland (Apr. 5, 1967), reprinted
in S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 7-8; Letter from Ramsey Clark to James 0.
Eastland (Feb. 7, 1967), reprinted in S. REP. No. 454, supra note 2, at 8-9.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
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Scope of the Statute.
The statute affects only the pre-trial stages in multi-district
litigation. It would not affect the place of trial in any case or
exclude transfer under other statutes (e.g., Title 28, U.S.C.
§§ 1404(a) and 1406(a)) prior to or at the conclusion of pre-trial
proceedings.

Limited Transfer.
The major innovation proposed is transfer solely for pre-trial
purposes. The statute's objectives of eliminating conflict and
duplication and of assuring efficient and economical pre-trial
proceedings would thus be achieved without losing the benefits of
18 4
local trials in the appropriate districts.
Does the use of § 1404(a) in a § 1407 proceeding "affect the place
of trial in any case?" Certainly it does, as hundreds of litigants can
attest. Clearly this was not the intention of the Coordinating
8 5
Committee or of Congress.
The report depicts how § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) interact with
§ 1407. The former sections may be used "prior to or at the
conclusion of pre-trial proceedings." 136 Before pretrial, cases are
in the transferor forum. It would be impossible for a transferee
court to handle a § 1404(a) motion; the transferee court would be
unknown. Likewise, at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings the
transferee court is precluded from making a § 1404(a) ruling. "[A]t
or before the conclusion of... pretrial proceedings" actions must
be remanded, 8 7 if they were not previously terminated. A case
cannot be in the transferee forum after the conclusion of pretrial.
This analysis leads to one feasible conclusion: transferor courts are
singularly empowered to make § 1404(a) decisions. If not, Congress

1M Report of the Co-ordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation Recommending
New Section 1407, Title 28 (Mar. 2, 1965), reprintedin In re Plumbing Fixture Cases,
298 F. Supp. 484,499 (1968) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Co-ordinating Committee
Report].
185 Congress was in agreement with the Coordinating Committee on the scope of
§ 1407. In its final report, the House incorporated language virtually identical to that
used in the Coordinating Committee's "Scope of the Statute" section. See H.R. REP.
No. 1130, supra note 2, at 2-3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1899-1900.
136 Co-ordinating Committee Report, supra note 134, at 499.
1s7 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
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repeatedly emphasized the "pretrial" nature of § 1407 for no reason
and wasted its ink when explicating specific reasons for not
permitting complete transfer.
2. Language of Section 1407
Congress enacted § 1407 in accordance with the understanding
of the statute in its development stage. Section 1407 states:
Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel
at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to
the district from which is was transferred unless it shall have
138
been previously terminated ....
This language admits of one interpretation: if a transferred action
13 9
is not terminated before the conclusion of pretrial proceedings,
it must be remanded. When a transferee judge uses § 1404(a) to
retain an action for trial, the case remains in the transferee district
despite the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, a plain violation of
§ 1407's language.
Given the plain language of the statute and Congress's express
statement that § 1407 would require amendment if transfer for trial
were to be permitted, 140 it is somewhat troubling that courts have
nevertheless developed the § 1407-§ 1404(a) technique to retain
cases for trial in the transferee forum. In re Air CrashDisasterNear
Hanover, New Hampshire on October 25, 196841 is a principal case
in the judicial development of the § 1407-§ 1404(a) combination.
Judge Bownes, sitting in the transferee court, acknowledged the
difficulty with the statute's language:
I must recognize candidly that there is nothing in the language
of 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) or 1404(a) which directly allows, or even
suggests, that the transferee judge has the power to transfer cases
to his district, or any district, for purposes of trial.... The power
to transfer 1407 cases pursuant to 1404(a) to a single district for
trial has been developed by judicial interpretation to meet the
problems imposed upon the federal courts by complex and
multidistrict cases.

142

18

3 Id. (emphasis added).

139 For a discussion of termination during pretrial, see supra notes 77-85 and

accompanying
text.
140 See supra text accompanying note 131.
141 342 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.H. 1971).
142 Id. at 909.
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The judge's candor is splendid bar one word: the development of
§ 1407-§ 1404(a) transfers occurred not through judicial "interpreta143
tion," but rather through judicial "manipulation."
Judge Lord, in In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 144 similarly
discounted the defendant's statutory language argument by
remarking: "[a]Ithough the defendants' reasoning has a certain
initial appeal, it breaks down on careful analysis."1 45 Strangely,
Judge Lord's careful analysis required a selective view of § 1407's
language and legislative history. 146 The decision was upheld on
147
appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
There is one sure way to get by a statutory language barricadedo an end run around it. The courts, as well as the Panel, 1 4 ' have
done so.
3. Section 1404(a) is Unnecessary for Pretrial
Section 1407 is undeniably pretrial-oriented. The only powers
a transferee court need exercise are those necessary to conduct
pretrial proceedings 149 or to dispose of actions in the pretrial

143 The advantages of trial in the transferee court,see suprapart III.C, undoubtedly make § 1404(a) tempting to the transferee judge. In Hanover,Judge Bownes had
before him 32 cases which arose out of a single airplane crash. See id. at 907. On the
issue of liability, each plaintiff would have presented very similar evidence and
examined the same witnesses, producing up to 32 repetitious trials (assuming no cases
came from the same transferor forum). Section 1404(a) enabledJudge Bownes, who
was intimately familiar with the matter, to bring all the cases together for a single
liability trial.
It is understandable thatJudge Bownes and other transfereejudges foresaw and
were tempted by the economies accompanying a § 1404(a) transfer of cases for all
purposes. Nonetheless, acting within its constitutional powers, Congress announced
that § 1407 would not affect the location of trial in any case. There are numerous
situations in which judges may see economies or efficiencies and desire to implement
their ideas but are limited by federal statutes. See e.g., Finley v. United States, 490
U.S. 545 (1989) (holding that pendent party jurisdiction is not permitted by statute).
The "dilemma" faced under § 1407 is no different.
144 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
145 Id. at 303.
146 See id. NonethelessJudge Lord's twisted reasoning seemed necessary in light
of his conclusion at an earlier stage of the matter that the cases before him were so
intertwined and complex that transfer "to a single district for trial purposes was a
prerequisite to working out a realistic 'trial plan.'" Id. at 301. Judge Lord was truly
between a rock and a hard place.
147 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971).
148 The Panel's Rule 14(b) also contradicts the legislative history and language of
§ 1407.
See R. PRoc. J.P.M.L. 14(b).
149
See Roger H. TrangsrudJoinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation,70 CORNELL
L. REV. 779, 807 (1985) (arguing "that any power of the transferee judge to make
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stage. 150 Neither the statute's language nor its legislative history
suggest that Congress intended the transferee court to possess all
powers that ajudge holds in an ordinary case. Yet the courts have
held otherwise. In In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 15 1 Judge Becker
stated that "the transferee court may make any order.., that might
have been rendered by the transferor court in the absence of
transfer." 152 When a § 1404(a) transfer is made with no involvement of § 1407, this statement is true; a § 1404(a) transferee court
has unfettered control over the case. 5 - Judge Becker's statement,
however, is not attributable to a § 1407 transferee court. An
example will show why.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) permits a judge to order
joint trial of any actions involving a common question of law or fact
pending before the court.1 54 This power is vested in every district
courtjudge. Suppose a party in a pending action consolidated for
pretrial purposes under § 1407 brings a Rule 42(a) motion before
the transferee judge. Can the transferee judge grant the motion
and retain the cases for trial? The holding in Plumbing Fixture
would lead one to believe he could. Yet this ability would utterly
pervert the congressional design of § 1407 and convert "pretrial" in
§ 1407 to verbiage. If the transferee judge held this power, then
anytime § 1407 was employed the judge could try the combined
cases simply by using Rule 42(a). Granting a Rule 42(a) motion in
a consolidated § 1407 matter is incompatible with the purpose of
§ 1407 and must, therefore, be outside the limits of the transferee
judge's power, if the limitations in the multidistrict litigation statute
are to be taken seriously. Judge Becker's statement in Plumbing
Fixture-thata transferee judge's power is "coextensive with that of

legal rulings [must] be an adjunct to the discovery process"). Transgrud argues that
transferee judges are precluded from using § 1404(a). See id. at 804-09.

150 See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text. A § 1407 transferee court does
not have the power to rule on any and all available pretrial motions. Indeed, certain
motions that are "pretrial," in the sense that they are most often decided before the
start of trial, are incompatible with § 1407's purposes and its mandate of remand at
the conclusion of pretrial proceedings.
151 298 F. Supp. 484 (J.P.M.L. 1968)
152 Id. at 495. Plumbing Fixture is cited in support of the § 1407-§ 1404(a)
combination in two of the seminal cases condoning the tactic. See Hanover, 342 F.
Sup,. at 909; Antibiotic Antitrust, 333 F. Supp. at 303.
Such a court is entitled to use § 1404(a) to transfer the case to yet another
district if it deems a second transfer appropriate. Moreover, nothing prevents the
court from using § 1404(a) to send the case back to the court from which it came.
1 4 See FED. R. CiV. P. 42(a).
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the transferor court"155 -cannot apply when the transferee court
is created through § 1407.

Recognizing that a transferee court's powers are limited, it
becomes important to determine what powers may properly be exercised. Given the pretrial orientation of § 1407, this determination
must be informed by considering which powers are "necessary" and
which are "unnecessary" to conduct pretrial proceedings or
terminate the claims. Rule 42(a) neither assists a § 1407 transferee
judge in pretrial matters nor terminates litigation. Accordingly,
Rule 42(a) cannot be utilized. For the same reasons, a change of
venue under § 1404(a) is beyond the scope of a transferee court's
power. Ruling on a § 1404(a) motion is not necessary to continue
or terminate pretrial proceedings.
4. The Limitations of Section 1404(a)
In addition to the § 1407 problems, § 1404(a) has its own
limitations. The panel has noted: "after an order changing venue
the jurisdiction of the transferor court ceases ... thereafter, the
transferor court can issue no further orders, and any steps taken by
it are of no effect." 156 During pendency of § 1407 proceedings,
no court other than the transferee court has jurisdiction over or
venue of the transferred case-the transferred case does not exist,
except in the transferee forum. It does not make sense for a
transferee court to assume jurisdiction over a case for trial by
ordering a "change" of venue under § 1404(a); the venue is already
the transferee court and none other. The language of § 1404(a)
illustrates this point: "a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district. " 157 A transferee court using § 1404(a) is not
transferring a case to another district. It is simply proclaiming trial
jurisdiction over the case.
Transferee courts improperly use § 1404(a) to acquire, rather
than relinquish, jurisdiction. A judge granting a § 1404(a) motion
always divests himself of jurisdiction over the transferred case. He
cannot use this statute to bring actions into his court.1 5 8 In es155 PlumbingFixture, 298 F. Supp. at 495.
156 Id. at 496.
157 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) (emphasis added).

158 A short illustration may prove beneficial. Case X is filed in the Eastern District
of New York. Defendant would like the case tried in the Northern District of Iowa.
Where can a § 1404(a) motion be filed? Only in the Eastern District of New York.
The Northern District of Iowa has no power to rule on such a motion. If the New
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sence, these courts have created a new "venue" statute sua sponte. l5 9 Section 1404(a) is merely a convenient decoy.
Transferee courts using § 1404(a) often violate its terms in
another manner. When contemplating transfer under § 1407, the
Panel must consider if transfers "will be for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of [the] actions." 160 Section 1404(a), however, can be
used only when transfer is "for the convenience of parties and
witnesses." 161 The courts sometimes forget which statute they
operate under. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,162 the Second Circuit affirmed the transferee court's use of § 1404(a), stating that the
transfer would assist in the efficient and just conduct of the
actions. 163 This statement typifies a transferee court's reasons for
employing § 1404(a); the concern is with judicial economies, not, as
§ 1404(a) requires, the parties' convenience.
Moreover, even a transferee court's idea of "convenience of
parties and witnesses" may vary greatly from a transferor court's.
The concept of "convenience of parties and witnesses" takes on an
entirely different meaning when a § 1404(a) motion, encompassing
tens or hundreds of cases, is brought before a § 1407 transferee
court. In such a setting, the interests of the individual litigants are
subordinated to the collective good.1 64 For this reason, transferee
courts are more likely to grant a § 1404(a) motion than transferor
courts.

16 5

Despite Judge Lord's contention that there is "absolutely" no
reason why transfereejudges should be barred from using § 1404(a)
to try § 1407 consolidated cases, there are numerous reasons: (1)
Congress clearly stated that, if appropriate, it would amend § 1407
York judge grants the motion, he purges himself of the case. A judge ruling on a
§ 1404(a) motion never, except in the § 1407 context, brings a case into his
jurisdiction.
159 By focusing on the propriety of using § 1404(a) in combination with § 1407,
courts have masterfully, perhaps unwittingly, avoided an inquiry into precisely what
§ 1404(a) permits.
160 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
161 See id. § 1404(a).
162 447 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1971)
163 See id. at 125.
164 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
165 See Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 7, at 525 ("The major problem that has
arisen when these two proceedings [§ 1407 and § 1404(a)] are combined is that the
efficiency standards of section 1407 many times overshadow the important individual
concerns that the courts examine under section 1404."); infratext accompanying note
188.
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to authorize trial in the transferee forum; (2) the statute's plain
language requires remand at the conclusion of pretrial if termination has not occurred; (3) § 1404(a) is unnecessary for a transferee
judge to conduct pretrial proceedings or terminate the litigation;
and (4) transferee judges ignore the requirements of § 1404(a).16 6
B. The Questionableness of Trial in the Transferee Court by Consent

Section 1404(a) may prove incapable of consolidating all § 1407transferred cases for trial. If a particular action could not originally
have been brought in the transferee court, the transferee judge
cannot obtain jurisdiction over the case through § 1404(a). 67
When judges have been unable to consolidate cases for trial via
§ 1404(a), parties have sometimes consented to trial in the transferee court.1 68 The legitimacy of consent, however, is highly suspect
in light of § 1407's design and the Supreme Court's ruling in
Hoffman v. Blaski.

16 9

Section 1407's language provides one reason to doubt that
consent to trial in the transferee court is permissible. The statute
provides that remand "shall" occur upon completion of pretrial
proceedings unless the case has been terminated. 170 The fact that
the parties agree to trial in the transferee forum seems irrelevant to
the statutory scheme; if the transferee court retains the cases for
trial by any means it violates the remand requirement. Congress
designed § 1407 so that it would not affect the place of trial in any
16 There is at least one additional argument. The Panel "may separate any claim,
cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before
the remainder of the action is remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988). If a transferee
court orders change of venue, the Panel would be precluded from remanding any of
the claims listed above. This would be an absurd result in light of the Panel's
congressional grant of power.
167 See id. § 1404(a) (declaring that a transfer can only be made to a district where
the action "might have been brought"); see also id. § 1406(a) (providing for transfer
of cases where venue is improperly laid to "any district or division in which it could
have been brought").
168 See, e.g., In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 551 n.7 (S.D. Tex.
1980) (noting that although a § 1404(a) transfer was precluded because the cases
could not have been brought in that district, the parties had waived venue and
consented to the resolution of a particular issue in the transferee court). But see In
re Tax Refund Litig., 723 F. Supp. 922, 925 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (ruling that one of four
§ 1407-consolidated cases could not be acquired for trial for lack of consent by the
parties).
169 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
170 See supra text accompanying note 138.
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case. 171 The statute does affect the place of trial when parties
consent-but for § 1407 the consent opportunity would not exist.
The rule announced by the Supreme Court in Hoffman also
undermines the argument that consent is a valid basis for retaining
an action for trial in the transferee court. In Hoffman, the Court

considered whether a district court "is empowered by § 1404(a) to
transfer [an] action ...

to a district in which [the defendant

consented to trial, but] the plaintiff did not have a right to bring
it."172 The plaintiff, Blaski, brought suit in the Northern District
of Texas against Howell for patent infringement. 173 Howell
moved, under § 1404(a), to transfer the action to the Northern
District of Illinois.1 74 Blaski objected, arguing that the judge
could not transfer the case to the Illinois court because Blaski could
not have originally brought his action in that forum.175 The
district judge granted the motion, holding that transfer would be
"for the convenience of the parties and witnesses in the interest of
177
justice." 176 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Upon transfer, Blaski immediately requested that the Illinois
district judge, Judge Hoffman, remand the case. 178 Judge
Hoffman denied the motion, and Blaski petitioned the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering Judge
Hoffman to reverse his decision. 179 The court of appeals granted
the writ, ruling that § 1404(a)'s language-"where it might have been
brought"-made clear that a case can only be transferred to a district
180
where the plaintiff had a right to bring it.
On further appeal in the Supreme Court, the defendant argued
that if he "move[d] to transfer the action to some other district and
consent[ed] to submit to the jurisdiction of such other district, the
171
172
173
174

See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 336.
See id.
See id.
175 See id. at 336-37 (noting that "the defendant[] did not reside, maintain a place
of business, or infringe the patents in, and could not have been served with process

in, the Illinois district").

176 See id. at 337.
177 The appellate court held that "[t]he purposes for which § 1404(a) was enacted

would be unduly circumscribed if a transfer could not be made 'in the interest of
justice' to a district where the defendants not only waive venue but to which they seek
the transfer." Id. (quoting Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737, 738 (5th Cir. 1957)).
178 See id.
171 See id. at 338.

180 See id.
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latter district should be held one 'in which the action might then
have been brought.'" 18 1 The Supreme Court disagreed:
Of course, venue, like jurisdiction over the person, may be waived.
A defendant, properly served with process by a court having
subject matter jurisdiction, waives venue by failing seasonably to
assert it, or even simply by making default. But the power of a
District Court under § 1404(a) to transfer an action to another
district is made to depend not upon the wish or waiver of the
defendant but, rather, upon whether the transferee district was
one in which the action "might have been brought" by the plain18 2
tiff.
Quoting partially from the Seventh Circuit opinion, the Court
added:
If when a suit is commenced, plaintiff has a right to sue in that
district, independently of the wishes of defendant, it is a district
'where [the action] might have been brought.' If he does not have
that right, independently of the wishes of defendant, it is not a
district 'where it might have been brought,' and it is immaterial
that the defendant subsequently [makes himself subject, by
consent, waiver of venue and personal jurisdiction defenses or
otherwise, to the jurisdiction of some other forum]. 1 3
Thus, under Hoffman, a § 1407-pretrial judge cannot order
transfer under § 1404(a), even with a party's consent, when the

plaintiff could not have brought suit in the transferee forum.
Although Hoffman does not expressly apply to simple submission by
both parties to trial in the transferee court (the ruling prevented the
combination of consent and a § 1404(a) transfer1 84), its principle
1s Id. at 342.
182 Id. at 343-44 (citations omitted).
183 Id. at 344 (bracketed material in original).
184 In In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex.
1980), the transferee court noted:
On December 20, 1979, the parties made ajoint motion to resolve in this
court the issue of the constitutionality of the state statute. The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, of course, did not transfer these cases for
such a resolution but only for consolidated pretrial proceedings. It would
have been inappropriate for this court to grant a motion for a change of
venue transferring the cases originally filed in the other districts to this
court; they could not "have been brought" here.... Neither the convenience of the parties norjudicial economy, however, would be promoted by
remanding the cases for trial of the one controlling issue in four different
districts. Accordingly, the parties waived proper venue and consented to
have the issue resolved in this court. The court ratified that consent.
Id. at 551 n.7 (citations omitted).
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is instructive and applicable: a court's ability to accept a litigant's
consent is limited; given the language, legislative history, and
purpose of § 1407, courts arguably are prohibited from ratifying
consent to trial in the multidistrict context. Congress expected
"[§ 1407] would not affect the place of trial in any case .... 185
C. Policy Considerations
Even disregarding the impropriety of using § 1404(a) and/or
consent to achieve trial in the transferee court, there are serious
shortcomings in such a system. These shortcomings, combined with
the observation that some multidistrict litigations are beneficially
handled through consolidated trial,"8 6 demonstrate the need to
amend § 1407.
1. The Transfer Decision
Currently, the nation's "specialists" in multidistrict litigation-the
Panel judges-have absolutely no voice in the trial decision. This is
the predominant and individually sufficient reason to amend
§ 1407; placing the trial decision solely in the hands of the transfer18 7
ee judge is problematic.
Transferee judges are prone to subverting legitimate concerns
of individual parties in the interest of expediency. They have been
more willing to grant § 1404(a) transfers than transferor judges.
"[D]ifferent standards may be applied depending upon whether the
1404 motion is decided by the transferee or the transferor
court."18 8 This variance is explained by the different perspectives

of transferor and transferee courts. The transferee court weighs
"convenience of parties and witnesses" on a collective scale; the
transferor court has only to focus on the individual litigants in a
single case. 189 Moreover, it is very difficult to reverse a transferee
185 H.R.

REP. No. 1130, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1900.

Obviously, by allowing parties to consent to trial in the transferee court, § 1407
affects the place of trial.
186
8 7 See supra part III.C.

1 Two early commentators split on the issue of who should make the trial

decision if § 1407 was amended to permit consolidated trial. Compare Note, supra
note 51, at 1038-40 (recommending the Panel have power to make the decision) with
Cooney, supra note 116, at 611 (treating the question tersely, but opining that the
transferee judge decide).
188 Levy, supra note 1, at 63; see also supra note 165.
189 See supra notes 63 & 160-65 and accompanying text.
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court's decision to consolidate under § 1404(a). The court has
broad discretion to utilize § 1404(a). 190
The decision to transfer for trial is a serious one. Unlike
pretrial, key witnesses may be vital at the trial stage, yet unable to

travel to a distant transferee forum. More importantly, litigants lose
91
individual control over their cases in consolidated proceedings.
Additionally, local discovery may be needed to supplement
coordinated pretrial. 192 The Panel is uniquely situated to evaluate
the merits of consolidated trial from a neutral viewpoint. While
appreciating the savings in judicial resources, the Panel could also
champion the interests of individual litigants who would be unduly
burdened by a consolidated trial. In addition, the Panel would
bring its expertise to bear on this important determination and
provide guidance to multidistrict litigants through written opinions.
In one specific type of action-parenspatriae claims brought by
state attorney generals under the Clayton Act for violations of the
Sherman Act-Congress has already permitted consolidation for
trial. 193 Importantly, Congress mandated that the Panel, not the
transferee court, decide whether joint trial is appropriate. Although
this provision did not exist when the § 1407-§ 1404(a) combination
developed, 194 its implications are profound. First, it shows that
Congress knows how to permit trial in the transferee forum-by
express language. 195 Second, it shows whom Congress desires to
make the trial decision-its expert panel on multidistrict litigation.

190 The courts of appeals will issue a writ of mandamus only when the transferee
judge dearly abuses his discretion. See Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758,
761 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that "1404 transfers are committed to the sound
discretion of the transferringjudge"); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883
F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that district courts have "broad discretion"
in determining § 1404(a) motions and that they "will not be reversed absent a clear
abuse of discretion").
191 Loss of individual control of the lawsuit was a notable concern of the
Coordinating Committee. "Proposed § 1407 [allowing transfer for pretrial only]
would maximize the litigant's traditional privileges of selecting where, when and how
to enforce his substantive rights or assert his defenses while minimizing possible
undue complexity from multi-party jury trials." Co-ordinating Committee Report,
supra note 134, at 499.
192 This was one of Congress's reasons for not originally allowing transfer for trial.
See H.R. REp. No. 1130, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1901-02.
193 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(h) (1988).
194 Section 1407(h) was added in 1976. See Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94435, § 303, 90 Stat. 1394, 1396.
195 This fact buttresses the argument that transferee courts are improperly using
§ 1404(a) to try the cases consolidated by the Panel for pretrial.
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2. Limited Transfers Under Section 1404(a)
Section 1404(a) allows transfer only if the proposed district is
196
one in which the action might originally have been brought.
If the transferee forum is one in which some of the cases consolidated for pretrial could not have been brought, 19 7 and if parties do
not consent to trial, the transferee court simply cannot try the
cases. 198 This limitation is particularly troublesome when the
transferee court needs to consolidate the cases to create a realistic
trial plan.19 9 Amending § 1407 to authorize consolidated trial in
any judicial district would eliminate this dilemma.
In light of this limitation, the Panel may be adding to the
inconvenience of multidistrict litigants. The Panel is fully cognizant
of the transferee courts' use of § 1404(a). 20 0 For this reason it
may overlook the most convenient pretrial transferee court because
all cases in a matter could not be consolidated for trial, through
§ 1404(a), in that forum. 20 1 In In re Yarn ProcessingPatent Validity
Litigation20 2 the Panel chose the Southern District of Florida as
the pretrial forum despite serious doubts that it was the most convenient pretrial forum. Judge Weinfeld, joined by Judge Wisdom and
Judge Weigel, dissenting from the Panel's forum choice, argued that
the Eastern District of New York was clearly the most convenient
forum and would best promote the ends of efficient justice, and he
provided a detailed analysis of the facts supporting his position.208 The Panel had other considerations in mind:
We are convinced that of the two proposed districts, the
Southern District of Florida is better suited to pretrial and ultimate
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); see also part IV.B (discussing Hoffman v. Blaski,
363 97
U.S. 335 (1960), in which the Court affirmatively recognized this limitation).
1 The Panel can transfer cases to any district for pretrial, whether or not the case
might have originally been brought there. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., In re Tax Refund Litig., 723 F. Supp. 922, 923 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
191 Seesupra note 123 and accompanying text (discussingJudge Lord's conclusion
that joint trial was necessary because of the interrelated and complex nature of the
matter before him).
200 The Panel's Rule 14(b) reminds transferee courts that they may use § 1404(a)
or § 1406(a). See R. PROc. J.P.M.L. 14(b).
201 Compare Conversation with Judge Charles Weiner, Former Member of the
Panel (March 7,1991) (stating that the Panel often looked down the line to transferee
court trial when choosing the transferee forum) with Telephone Interview withJudge
Louis Pollak, Member of the Panel (February 19, 1991) (stating that the Panel's usual
focus is upon the best forum for pretrial).
202 341 F. Supp. 376 (J.P.M.L. 1972).
203 See id. at 384-89 (Weinfeld, J., dissenting).
196
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trial of the principal issues involved in the litigation.... Lex-Tex
has not been named a defendant in the Eastern District of New
York. The briefs and arguments of the parties have created grave
doubt whether it can be made a party defendant in that district for
purposes of trial. Counsel for the New York plaintiffs conceded
at the hearing that Lex-Tex was not named in the amended
complaint because the plaintiffs initially doubted whether it could
be sued there.... No such problem is presented in Florida, where
20 4
Lex-Tex is incorporated and maintains its only office.
The Florida forum was "better suited" because that transferee judge
could use § 1404(a) to consolidate the cases for trial.20 5 Amending § 1407 to permit the Panel to transfer for pretrial and trial
would alleviate this unfortunate extra inconvenience placed upon
some multidistrict litigants.
3. Adding Flexibility
In addition to dispensing with the limitations in § 1404(a),
amending § 1407 to permit the Panel to consolidate would create
other advantages.
Section 1407 provides that "the panel may
separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim
and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action
is remanded." 20 6 When a transferee judge consolidates under
§ 1404(a) the Panel is denied the opportunity to exercise its
statutory power to remand these types of claims. Placing the ability
to consolidate for trial in the Panel's hands would permit this "early
remand" power to be exercised and this obligation to be taken
20 7
seriously.
The asbestos litigation2 0 8 points to another tremendous
advantage that could be realized by amending § 1407. Judge
Weiner has over 26,000 cases before him as the transferee judge.
Even if every single litigant could originally have brought suit in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania so that § 1404(a) could be used to

204 See id. at 382 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
205 See id. at 382 ("[W]hen, as here, our decision precedes

some potential transfers
under Section 1404(a), we believe it our duty to select the transferee district best able
to serve as trial forum 7.... ").
206 28 U.S.C. § 140 (a) (1988).
207 This clause in the statute again raises the argument for amending § 1407
because using § 1404(a) in the multidistrict context is statutorily impermissible. The
power of the Panel to remand a specific claim "before the remainder of the action,"
presupposes that remand will in fact occur.
208See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
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consolidate the cases in Pennsylvania for trial, doing so would prove
futile. There are countless different types of claims in this massive
litigation;20 9 it would perhaps take a lifetime for a judge to try the
different groups of claims. The Panel, however, could do wonders
if it had the ability to transfer the claims for trial. After Judge
Weiner gains an understanding of the types of plaintiffs, claims,
defenses, defendants, etc., through pretrial proceedings, the Panel
could strategically transfer groups of cases by type, geographic
location, or both to forums throughout the nation for consolidated
trials. The ability to vary the trial forum from the pretrial forum
could produce significant efficiencies.
V. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION UNDER AN AMENDED § 1407.

Placing the power to transfer for trial in the Panel's hands would
not mean the Panel would make its decision in a vacuum. The
Panel is not in day-to-day contact with transferred matters. The
transferee judge's intimate knowledge of a matter has resulted in
the Panel deferring to his remand recommendation, 210 even
211
though the Panel is empowered to order remand at any time.
Developments during pretrial can affect the appropriateness of a
consolidated trial just as they can affect the appropriateness of
remand under the current § 1407. Therefore, a Panel decision to
transfer a matter for all purposes when the matter is first before the
Panel might prove erroneous as pretrial events unfold. 1 2 Like
the remand decision, the Panel should not make the consolidation
decision without input from the transferee judge.
A system to determine whether to consolidate for trial must be
modeled on the current system for determining whether to remand:
input from the transferee judge as to the suitability of consolidated
trial with final authority vested in the Panel. Under this proposal,
the Panel would conduct an initial hearing on pretrial transfer, as
presently done, during which it would become familiar with the
matter. Based on the type of matter, the Panel could make a
29 See id. at 423 (providing examples of the types of cases: "maritime asbestos
actions, railroad worker actions, friction materials actions, tire worker actions, etc.").
210

See supra note 75.

211 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
212 Cf. Note, supra note 51, at 1039 (asserting that although the Panel might

sometimes have to delay a decision on trial until completion of pretrial, "the Panel
will usually be able to make early determinations because there is a large degree of
predictability in the issues which are suitable for consolidated trial").
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21 3
preliminary assessment of the possibility for consolidated trial.
Upon transfer for pretrial, one or two Panel judges would act as
liaison with the transferee judge and monitor the transferred
matter. Under the present statute, monitoring is implicitly required
because the Panel is obligated to remand all actions, unless
terminated in pretrial, 214 and to remand claims, when necessary,
before the rest. 215 The Panel's current policy of deference to the
transferee judge and the use of § 1404(a) by the transferee courts
severely diminishes the monitoring responsibility.
Under the
proposal, the assigned transferee judge or judges would pay close
attention to each matter, considering seriously the possibility of
remand, early remand of selected claims, and consolidation for trial.
In certain types of matters, of course, very little monitoring would
be required.
At the conclusion of pretrial, litigants would voice their opinions
on consolidated trial, if the transferee judge, the Panel, or a party
made such a suggestion. If all parties agree to trial in the transferee
forum it would automatically occur, assuming the transferee judge
is available. A motion to transfer for trial should only involve the
Panel when there is difference of opinion. 216 If one litigant
favored complete transfer and others opposed it, or if the transferee
judge favored joint trial in contrast to the parties, the Panel would
become involved.
When there is difference of opinion on a motion for consolidated trial or when the transferee judge believes remand is
appropriate, the judge would apprise the Panel of the situation.
Like the current remand policy, the Panel judges would often be

215 One commentator notes:

In air disaster cases, liability has frequently been handled on a consolidated
basis while determination of damages has been left to transferor courts and
local juries. Similarly, the issue of patent validity has frequently been
litigated in a single trial; and although infringement has been decided in
the same manner, it is more often appropriate for individual handling. The
liability issue in antitrust cases has been found suitable for a consolidated
trial, and if class actions are involved, disposition in the transferee court is
almost certain. Securities litigation also often involves class actions
appropriate for consolidation beyond pretrial.
Id. at 1039-40 (footnotes omitted).
214 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988) (indicating that"action[s]... shall be remanded
by the panel at or before the conclusion of ... pretrial").
215 See id.

216 This difference of opinion might arise over the extent of consolidated trial;
litigants may agree that certain issues warrant joint trial (such as liability), but prefer
trial on other issues in the original forum (such as damages).
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deferential to the transferee judge. But the Panel's unique insight,
expertise in multidistrict litigation, or knowledge gained through
monitoring activities might prompt them to decide differently or
remand particular individual actions in which continued consolidation would place high burdens on the parties. Moreover, the
Panel could provide structure to the issue of consolidated trial
through its opinions.
In light of the hardships that a combined trial can create, the
Panel should intervene to breathe life into the phrase, "for the
convenience of parties and witnesses." 217 By vesting the Panel
with authority to make the final decision on transfer for trial, it
would be forced to play a more active monitoring role, which in
turn might resuscitate "convenience of parties."
In most instances the pretrial forum would continue as the trial
forum. Changes in the nature or scope of the litigation during
pretrial, however, could make the pretrial court a less convenient
trial forum than other courts. When choosing a trial forum, the
Panel would consider which district best serves the "convenience of
parties and witnesses" and "promotes the just and efficient conduct"
of the actions. The factors that currently guide the Panel in picking
the pretrial transferee court would continue to form the framework
218
for picking a trial forum.
This proposed scheme is notably one in which the transferee
judge, who is most knowledgeable of a matter, plays a significant
role in the decision for consolidated trial. The Panel would rely to
some extent upon his guidance, but monitor the cases and/or hold
a second hearing on the trial consolidation issue to help inform its
219
decision.
217 There is no reason to think that convenience of parties should always be
sacrificed to judicial economy. If a deserving situation presents itself, convenience
must be elevated above judicial economy.
As previously noted, see supra notes 63 & 165, "convenience of parties" may be
viewed as an aggregate or individual concept. When the § 1407 transferee judge
considers a § 1404(a) motion the tendency is to ignore individuals. See supra part
IV.C.1. A well-informed Panel could combat this tendency.
218 These factors are intensely case specific and it would prove futile to attempt
a listing of them. A few of the commonly cited factors were previously mentioned.
See su ra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
219Recall that frequently some parties do not argue before the Panel at the
pretrial transfer hearing as there are often too many cases in a matter for the Panel
to hear each litigant. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. To assist proper
accounting of the hardships of a distant trial, a second hearing would prove
advantageous. Alternatively, if the transferor court hadbecome familiarized with the
case before pretrial transfer, its communication with the Panel could be beneficial.
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CONCLUSION
Commentators have long suggested that § 1407 be amended. 22 0 With support for emendation currently mounting, especial221
ly recommendation by the Federal Courts Study Committee,
Congress may modify § 1407 on its own initiative. But if the past
is indicative of the future, Congress will remain inactive. 222 The
search is then for a catalyst to prompt congressional action.
Presumably, Congress recognizes that consolidated trial is
conducive to efficient judicial administration. In the past two
decades it has not thwarted the use of § 1404(a) in conjunction with
§ 1407. If this procedure were abruptly halted, a "rush" to the
drafting table would likely ensue.
The discussion in Part IV.A shows that a transferee court violates § 1407 and § 1404(a) when it consolidates a matter for trial.
Several courts of appeals have yet to rule on the propriety of this
judicial innovation. 223 A decision condemning the practice in
even one court of appeals could spark the amendment fire.
Like most courts of appeals, the Supreme Court has not squarely
224
confronted the propriety of the § 1407-§ 1404(a) combination.
A prohibiting decision by the Court would probably result in
expedited congressional action; the impact would be nationwide.
Moreover, the Court, could make an appeal to Congress for
220 See Cooney, supra note 116, at 609-11; Note, supra note 51, at 1037-38.
221 See Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, April 2, 1990, at 45. The
Committee stated: "We believe ... that the federal trial forum should be available to
ensure the economy of one court's resolving disputes involving multiple parties from
many states. Thus we recommend that Congress broaden § 1407(a) to allow for
consolidated trial as well as pretrial proceedings." Id. Other notables are in
agreement. Judge Weinstein contends that "[t]ransfer of cases within the federal
system for full trial under the multidistrict litigation statute" would prove beneficial.
Jack B. Weinstein, PreliminaryReflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 1, 23 (1986).
222 In 1983, Representative Kastenmeier unsuccessfully proposed an expansion of
multidistrict litigation to allow consolidated trial on the issue of liability. See H.R.
4159, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). In 1984, Senator Specter introduced a bill, to no
avail, to permit consolidated trial of antitrust cases. See S. 2260, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984).
223 Only the Second Circuit has faced this issue directly. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,
447 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that the districtjudge, to whom cases were
assigned by the Panel, had the authority to order a § 1404(a) transfer). Other circuits
have made note of the practice in their opinions, but have not ruled specifically on
its appropriateness.
224 In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Court mentioned the
practice in dicta. See id. at 762-63.

1991]

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

225
clarification, as it recently did on another jurisdictional issue.
The difficulty is, of course, getting the Court to grant certiorari. A
ruling contrary to Pfizer would create a division in the courts
of
226
appeals, a situation in which the Court often grants certiorari.
Judicial legitimation of the § 1407-§ 1404(a) process has likely
slowed the evolution of § 1407. If transferee courts and the Panel
had not attempted to solve the transfer-for-all-purposes problem by
sophistry, Congress would likely have amended § 1407 by now. The
present situation is less than ideal; a restructuring of the statute to
enhance the Panel's role in multidistrict litigation is needed. But a
complacent Congress needs prodding to act. The sharpest prodding
could come from those who placated Congress in the first place-the
courts.

225 See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). The Finey Court refused to

condone pendent party jurisdiction because Congress had not spoken. The Court
suggested: "Whatever we say regarding the scope ofjurisdiction... can of course
be changed by Congress." Id. at 556. Shortly thereafter Congress codified
supplemental jurisdiction. For an examination of this "successful dialogue," see
Thomas M. Mengler, Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Congress Accepts
Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify SupplementalJurisdiction,74JUDIcATURE 213, 214,
216 (1991).
226 See, e.g., Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989)
(settling a circuit split over a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11 issue); Hoffman
v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960) (clarifying a circuit split regarding § 1404(a)).

